

29 June 1961

## NONALIGNED NATIONS CONFERENCE

Background. The idea of holding a conference of "nonaligned" nations developed out of the round of visits last spring between Tito, Nasir, and Sukarno, with the major initiatives coming from the first two. Tito and Nasir share the view that as heads of small states with little influence by themselves but with pretensions to broader leadership the best means to advance their interests is to create a bloc of states which agree on general foreign policy and which might be brought to express their policy views collectively. With this in mind, in late April they sent unpublicized letters to seventeen other states, and in May formally invited these governments to send representatives to a preparatory conference in Cairo in June.

The Invitees and their Attitudes. In the eyes of the sponsors, India was the most important state whose attendance had to be assured. They were unable to secure Nehru as a formal co-sponsor, although Nasir went to some lengths to try to dissipate the Indian leader's fears that the conference

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instructions apply.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. SHELDON

The President directed Mr. Bundy to get as much information as possible on the reaction of Afghanistan, Guinea and Mali to the Neutral Nations Conference. He directed this

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C. V. CLIFTON

would merely add to rather than ease world tensions or would lead to the formation of a bloc which might limit India's freedom of action. The Indians finally agreed to come, obviously without enthusiasm, because they saw no practicable way of staying away. The other Asians invited--Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal and Afghanistan--came as a matter of course. The sponsors were also anxious to secure Latin American participation--the UAR has a long-standing program of developing relations with Latin America--but of the four states invited only Cuba participated fully. Brazil sent an observer, while Venezuela and Mexico declined to attend. 25X1

Ghana came, along with Guinea, Mali and Morocco, apparently determined to follow a "hard line" on issues of particular interest to it, such as the admission of Gizenga's Congo regime to the conference. The other invitees consisted of the quieter independent Africans--Sudan, Ethiopia and the Somali Republic--plus Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen as uncommitted Arabs.

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Sino-Soviet Attitudes. Publicly, the USSR and Communist China maintained a "no-comment" attitude; TASS took factual note of the preparatory meeting of what it termed "so-called noncommitted states" for the first time on 12 June, when the meeting was nearly over. In private, however, Moscow and Peiping expressed reservations, particularly concerning the role of Tito and the possibility that the conference would somehow be used by the West.

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[REDACTED]

was naturally unhappy over the concept of a conference grouping nonaligned states in place of the Afro-Asian conferences of former years at which Communist China had usually played a leading role. Apparently resigned to the fact that the conference would take place, Peiping urged that it adopt a series of stiff anti-imperialist resolutions.

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Issues at the Preparatory Conference. The Cairo meeting, which lasted from 5 to 13 June, had no trouble in deciding that the full conference should open on 1 September in Yugoslavia. The conferees, mostly ambassadors or special

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representatives, also gave way fairly easily to India's desire that the recommended agenda for the September meeting consist of topics of world-wide interest rather than specific local issues such as Congo, Mauritania, Palestine, Pushtunistan, etc. What kept the Cairo meeting for nine days--four more than planned--was acrimonious debate over the criteria of nonalignment and, more specifically, over which additional states should be added to the Cairo meeting and/or invited to the full conference. The rebel Algerian Provisional Government was added, but a proposal to invite a Gizenga representative was shelved for future consideration. Beyond this the conferees never reached genuine agreement on expanding the conference.

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[REDACTED] As world press attention comes to focus on the conference in Yugoslavia, there will be substantially greater pressure on every participant to assume his standard public pose of virtuous unanimity with his nonaligned brethren. Only a deliberate Sino-Soviet effort to disrupt the proceedings through Cuban or possibly Guinean intransigence would seem enough to break down the conference, and such a move is unlikely.

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